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AFFECTING ETERNITY: THE COURT'S CONFUSED LESSON
IN BOARD OF EDUCA TION V. EARLS
George M. Dery III*
In Board of Education v. Earls, the US. Supreme Court found the random drug
testing of schoolchildren who participated in extracurricular activities to be
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In this Article, Professor Dery argues
that this latest extension of the special needs doctrine is both patronizing to student
privacy interests and inconsistent with the Court's previous limitation of
suspicionless searches in New Jersey v. T.L.O. and Chandler v. Miller. Professor
Dery criticizes the Court's Earls decision as a confused lesson in constitutional law,
abandoning the very fundamentals of the Fourth Amendment.
"A teacher affects eternity; he can never tell where his influence stops.
Henry Adams
1. INTRODUCTION
How much should we trust our schoolchildren? Life in our nation's schools is
fraught with risk at every turn. If your child shows promising musical ability, be
forewarned that perils lie ahead when he or she joins the high school marching band.
The school district of Tecumseh, Oklahoma has warned that such band members
must "perform extremely precise routines with heavy equipment and instruments in
close proximity to other students."2 If instead, you have a prodigy in the agricultural
sciences, think twice before enrolling them in the Future Farmers of America, in
which students must control animals "as large as 1500 pounds."3 Also, future chefs
are not insulated from danger. The Future Homemakers of America work with
hazards hidden even in seemingly mundane "cutlery" and "sharp instruments. 4
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300 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1918) (1907).
2 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 851 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
3id.
4 Id.
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Add drug use to the mix, and one shudders at the prospect of what might happen
with an errant trombone, hog, or spatula.
The Supreme Court, however, is working to protect the nation from the hazards
attending the mix of drugs with band equipment, domesticated animals, or flatware.
In Board of Education v. Earls, the Court found the random drug testing of
schoolchildren participating in extracurricular activities reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.5 The Court reached this conclusion in part due to its concern that
schoolchildren receive adequate protection to enable learning. Notably, the Earls
Court recognized the State's "'special responsibility of care and direction"' over its
children.6 In regards to directing our youth, however, it is unclear precisely what
lesson Earls is teaching the nation's schoolchildren.
The plaintiffs bringing suit in this case were high school students.7 Presumably,
plaintiffs Lindsay Earls and Daniel James were only a few years away from
exercising their right to vote or their privilege to protect our country in the armed
forces. They may have even been entrusted with driving on our streets and
highways. It could be argued that Ms. Earls and Mr. James, verging on adulthood,
must be prepared for these responsibilities by learning the lesson of individual
judgment and self-reliance. The Supreme Court, however, has chosen to send a
message that our future citizens are not to be trusted even to join a choir or pom pon
without a drug test.'
This Article begins, in Part II, with a review of the doctrine that forms the
underpinnings of the Earls Court's rationale: special needs. Part III examines Earls
- its facts, lower court litigation, and the Court's decision. In Part IV, this Article
assesses the Court's analysis and thus considers the lessons taught by the opinion
rendered by the Earls Court.
II. THE SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE
As they stand in their stalls providing officials with urine samples, students at
Tecumseh High School can trace their loss of privacy back to a fourteen-year-old
high school freshman, known only as T.L.O., who chose to smoke a cigarette in a
Id. at 830. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6 Earls, 536 U.S. at 834 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 662
(1995)).
Id. at 826.
8 See id.
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school bathroom.9 In New Jersey v. TL.O., when a teacher caught T.L.O. violating
the school rules by "smoking in the lavatory," the teacher sent her to the office of
the assistant vice principal."0 T.L.O. not only denied smoking in the bathroom, but
"claimed that she did not smoke at all."" The assistant vice principal then promptly
searched T.L.O.'s purse, finding a pack of cigarettes, which he held before her "as
he accused her of having lied to him."' 2 The recovery of the cigarettes in turn
exposed evidence of marijuana possession and dealing. 3 The State later presented
this evidence against T.L.O. in juvenile court. 4
This public school search of a student's purse presented the Court in TL. 0. with
an interaction between government and individual that differed from the criminal
investigation norm. In the usual case, the Court recognized a "warrant requirement"
in which government officials could not intrude upon individual privacy without
first obtaining a search warrant. 1" This Fourth Amendment warrant preference has
been heralded repeatedly by the Court throughout the decades. 6 Justice White, who
authored the Court's opinion in T.L. 0., was alert to the case's unique setting beyond
the traditional law enforcement boundaries; he thus recognized that what was
"reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment depended on "the context within which
a search takes place."' 7 To therefore determine reasonableness of searches in the
school setting, the T.L. 0. Court balanced "'the need to search against the invasion
which the search entails.""' 8 Justice White then declared that a school official's
"search of a child's person or of a closed purse or other bag carried on her person,
no less than a similar search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe
violation of subjective expectations of privacy."' 9 The Court, however, also took
heed of the government's needs in the matter, stating: "Against the child's interest
in privacy must be set the substantial interest of teachers and administrators in
maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds."20 Balancing the
student's interest in privacy against the school's interest in discipline, T.L.0. found
the search, based as itwas on "reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will
9 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 328 (1985).
10 Id.
I11 ld.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 329.
I d. at 340.
16 For discussion of the warrant requirement, see Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366,
372 (1993); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,825 (1982); Katzv. United States, 389 U.S.
347,357 (1967); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925); Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
" T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337.
ISId (quoting Camara v. Mun. Ct., 38 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)).
19 Id at 337-38.
20 ld. at 339.
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turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the
rules of the school," to be reasonable.21 The actual naming of this new kind of
analysis as one of "special needs" fell to Justice Blackmun in his concurring
opinion."
Thus, in its first case to apply special needs balancing to the competing interests
at a school, the Court still adhered to a mandate of individualized suspicion - the
reasonable suspicion standard. This is graphically illustrated by the Court's detailed
link-by-link analysis of the chain of suspicion supporting the vice principal's search
for marijuana.23 Justice White began by considering, for three pages of the Court's
opinion, the first link of chain: whether the school official possessed reasonable
suspicion to search T.L.O.'s purse for cigarettes.24 Then, upon removing the
package of cigarettes, reasonable suspicion for the marijuana search was established
by the official's observation of rolling papers.25 The step-by-step reliance upon
reasonable suspicion continued as follows:
The discovery of the rolling papers concededly gave rise to a reasonable
suspicion that T.L.O. was carrying marihuana as well as cigarettes in her
purse. This suspicion justified further exploration of T.L.O.'s purse,
which turned up more evidence of drug-related activities: a pipe, a
number of plastic bags of the type commonly used to store marihuana,
a small quantity of marihuana, and a fairly substantial amount of
money.26
This, in turn, enabled a further search of a "separate zippered compartment of the
purse," which revealed sheets "containing a list of 'people who owe[d] [T.L.O.]
money' and letters.27 This careful analysis thus demonstrates that the Court, in its
first special needs case involving public schools, disciplined itself to maintain a
rigorous individualized suspicion standard.
Any protection provided by TL.O.'s reasonable suspicion standard was short-
lived. The Court's next two special needs cases, Skinner v. Railway Labor
2Id. at 342.
22 Justice Blackmun emphasized: "Only in those exceptional circumstances in which
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-
cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for
that of the Framers." Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
23 Id. at 343-48.
24 Id. at 343-46.
25 Id. at 347.
26 Id.
27 Id.
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Executives 'Ass 'n28 and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,29 allowed
the government to intrude without any showing of individualized suspicion.
Further, these two toxicology cases sanctioned invasions beyond searches of articles
being carried to the testing of fluids from the body." Again, the Court reached such
conclusions by a balancing of the interests of society against those of the individual.
In Skinner, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) mandated "blood and
urine tests of employees who [were] involved in certain train accidents,"'" and
permitted "breath and urine tests" of employees who violated "certain safety
rules."32 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, explicitly acknowledged the
Court's warrant requirement by noting:
In most criminal cases, we strike [the balance of interests] in favor of the
procedures described by the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment.
Except in certain well-defined circumstances, a search or seizure in such
a case is not reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial
warrant issued upon probable cause.33
By the same token, the Skinner Court added that: "We have recognized exceptions
to this rule, however, 'when special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable."' 34
The railroad regulations addressed such special needs, because "[t]he FRA has
prescribed toxicological tests, not to assist in the prosecution of employees, but
rather 'to prevent accidents and casualties in railroad operations that result from
impairment of employees by alcohol or drugs."'
35
Skinner then used the special needs label to individually pickoff each Fourth
Amendment protection. The first to go was any need for prior judicial approval,
dispatched with the dismissive conclusion that "[w]e do not believe that a warrant
is essential to render the intrusions here at issue reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. 36 When Justice Kennedy set his sights on the probable cause
standard, he declared that "a showing of individualized suspicion is not a
constitutional floor, below which a search must be presumed unreasonable. 37 The
Court therefore jettisoned the requirement of any level of individualized suspicion
28 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
29 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
30 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 678-79; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620-21.
"' Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606, 609.
32 Id. at 606, 611.
" Id. at 619 (citations omitted).
34 Id. (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
31 Id. at 620-21.
36 Id. at 624.
37 Id.
115920031
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by reasoning:
In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the
search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest
furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement
of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the
absence of such suspicion. We believe this is true of the intrusions in
question here.3"
Deeming the privacy interests in the contents of one's own body "minimal"
necessitated a review of the magnitude of intrusions involved as well as a reliance
on the "employment context in which [testing] takes place." 9 As to the size of the
invasions caused by the tests, Skinner found the "intrusion occasioned by a blood
test" to be "not significant," for such "'tests are a commonplace in these days of
periodic physical examinations.' 40 Breath tests were "even less intrusive" for they
did not "require piercing of the skin.""' Likewise, urine tests were "not invasive of
the body. 42 The Court then moved on to the even more important variable:43 the
context of the searches. Justice Kennedy urged that: "[E]xpectations of privacy of
covered employees are diminished by reason of their participation in an industry that
is regulated pervasively to ensure safety, a goal dependent, in substantial part, on the
health and fitness of covered employees."
In contrast to the small intrusions on employees, the government's concerns
loomed large. The FRA had a "compelling" interest in testing "without a showing
of individualized suspicion." '4 Justice Kennedy warned of the continual danger of
catastrophe hovering over the rails run by frail human beings, fretting that
"[e]mployees subject to the tests discharge duties fraught with such risks of injury
to others that even a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous
consequences." ' 6 Indeed, the slightest mental misstep could trigger an event in
proportion to those at "nuclear power facilities.""7 Further, mandating the gathering
of individualized suspicion during the bedlam of a train wreck might defy practical
reality. Skinner recognized:
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 625 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966)).
41 Id. at 625.
42 Id. at 626.
43 Id. at 627.
4 Id.
4, Id. at 628.
46 Id.
47 Id.
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Investigators who arrive at the scene shortly after a major accident has
occurred may find it difficult to determine which members of a train
crew contributed to its occurrence. Obtaining evidence that might give
rise to the suspicion that a particular employee is impaired, a difficult
endeavor in the best of circumstances, is most impracticable in the
aftermath of a serious accident."
- The government's "compelling interests" therefore outweighed the employees'
"privacy concerns," enabling the railroads to perform suspicionless toxicological
testing under the Fourth Amendment."
The Court struck the same balance of interests in Von Raab, in which employees
of the United States Customs Service were required to submit to drug tests before
being placed in positions involving "drug interdiction," carrying of "firearms," or
handling "'classified' material.""0 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Von Raab Court,
once again acknowledged that, "as a general matter," a search needed to be
supported by "a warrant issued upon probable cause."'" He noted, however, that the
purpose of the testing in Von Raab was to "deter drug use among those eligible for
promotion to sensitive positions within the Service and to prevent promotion of drug
users to those positions" rather than to pursue "criminal prosecution[s]. '"2 Von
Raab therefore deemed this goal to be "beyond the normal need for law
enforcement" and thus one of "special governmental needs."53
As in Skinner, the Court in Von Raab found the balance of interests tilted in the
government's favor.54 The privacy concerns of individual agents were diminished
by their choice of profession, for it should be "plain that certain forms of public
employment may diminish privacy expectations even with respect to ... personal
searches."55 The scrutiny that the customs agents reasonably could expect was
analogous to that placed on employees of the United States Mint, the military, or
intelligence services, who "may not only be required to give what in other contexts
might be viewed as extraordinary assurances of trustworthiness and probity, but also
may expect intrusive inquiries into their physical fitness for those special
positions. 56
The diminished concerns of the individual officer paled in comparison to the
interests of the government in Von Raab. The "'smuggling of illicit narcotics' had
48 Id. at631.
49 Id. at 633.
50 Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660-61 (1989).
" Id. at 665.
12 Id. at 666.
" Id. at 665.
14 Id. at 677.
" Id. at 671.56 Id.
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created a "'veritable national crisis in law enforcement.' ' Further, it was the
Customs Service that formed "our Nation's first line of defense" against such drug
trafficking." Customs officers consequently were "targets of bribery,"59 subject to
"blackmail,"6 and in danger of committing "integrity violations. '61 Justice Kennedy
therefore concluded that "[t]he Government's need to conduct the suspicionless
searches required by the Customs program outweighs the privacy interests of
employees engaged directly in drug interdiction, and of those who otherwise are
required to carry firearms." '2
After considering risks on the scale of nuclear reactors and espionage, it might
seem that a return to the school setting would be a let down. Not for the Court, as
it found a series of hazards lurking on the playing field in Vernonia School District
47J v. Acton.63 In Vernonia, an Oregon logging community in "small-town
America," was suddenly and dramatically transformed by drugs in its schools during
the mid-i 980s.' School officials witnessed such a "sharp increase in drug use" that
students had no qualms openly speaking about the "drug culture" and even boasting
that "there was nothing the school could do about it." '65 Disciplinary referrals more
than doubled since before the drug problems, "outbursts of profane language became
common," and coaches observed failures in following "safety procedures" and an
increase in sports-related injuries.' The school officials responded by providing
"classes, speakers, and presentations," and even brought a drug-detecting dog on
campus.67 None of these attempted remedies worked. 68 The administration found
itself "'at its wits end' for "'a large segment of the student body, particularly those
involved in interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion.'
69
To deal with this crisis, the School District implemented a "Student Athlete
Drug Policy," in which those wishing to participate in school sports were required
to sign forms consenting to suspicionless drug testing.7 ° Students consequently
submitted to two testing procedures, in which: 1) every student was tested at the
beginning of the sport's season; and 2) each week, ten percent of the athletes were
"' Id. at 668 (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hemandez, 473 U.S. 531,538 (1985)).
58 Id.
19 Id. at 669.
60 Id. at 674.
61 Id. at 669.
62 Id. at 668.
63 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
64 Id. at 648.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 649.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. (quoting Acton v. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Ore.
1992)).
10 Id. at 650.
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randomly selected to provide samples for testing.7 The guidelines for sampling
were quite explicit:
The student. .. enters an empty locker room accompanied by an adult
monitor of the same sex. Each boy selected produces a sample at a
urinal, remaining fully clothed with his back to the monitor, who stands
approximately 12 to 15 feet behind the student. Monitors may (though
do not always) watch the student while he produces the sample, and they
listen for normal sounds of urination. Girls produce samples in an
enclosed bathroom stall, so that they can be heard but not observed.
After the sample is produced, it is given to the monitor, who checks it for
temperature and tampering and then transfers it to a vial.72
Students with two positive test results faced a choice of attending an "assistance
program" requiring weekly testing, or being suspended from school athletics."
James Acton, a seventh grader wishing to play football, refused to sign the consent
form and thus was denied entry into school athletics.74 James Acton and his parents
sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the forced urinalysis violated
a series of rights, including the Fourth Amendment.75
The Vernonia Court wasted little effort in categorizing the case as one of
"'special needs,"' because "in the public school context . . . , the warrant
requirement 'would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal
disciplinary procedures [that are] needed,' and 'strict adherence to the requirement
that searches be based on probable cause' would undercut 'the substantial need of
teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools."' 76 Thus,
Justice Scalia, the author of the majority opinion in Vernonia, had quickly pushed
aside most of the Fourth Amendment protections. The only obstacle to the
government's testing program that remained was "individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing. 77 Indeed, TL.O. - the only other special needs case in the school
setting - kept and relied upon this last vestige of Fourth Amendment protection.78
To relieve Vernonia from T.L.O.'s reasonable suspicion requirement, Justice
Scalia aimed to liken Vernonia's facts to those of the suspicionless testing cases:
71 Id.
72 Id.
71 Id. at 651.
74 Id.
71 Jd. at 652.
76 Id. at 653 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985)) (alteration in
original).
77 Id. at 653.
78 Id.
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Skinner and Von Raab.79 This feat demanded the formulation of an elaborate test.80
For this task, the Vernonia Court further parsed special needs' typical balancing of
interests into the following factors: 1) the students' "decreased expectation of
privacy," 2) the "relative unobtrusiveness of the search," and 3) the "severity of the
need met by the search.""1  Hovering above all these interests was the "most
significant element": the "government's responsibilities, under a public school
system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its care."82 Despite the
complexity of Justice Scalia's new test, its outcome predictably followed those of
the prior special needs cases; the government's concern in deterring "drug use by
our Nation's schoolchildren"" a outweighed the students' needs, particularly since the
athletes had diminished their own privacy interests by going "out for the team."84
Therefore, Vernonia held that urinalysis of student athletes was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, even lacking any individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.85
After a decade of consistently supporting the government in special needs cases,
the Court took an abrupt turn in Chandler v. Miller.86 Chandler arose in Georgia,
where the state legislature had passed a law requiring that each "candidate seeking
to qualify for nomination or election to a state office shall as a condition of such
qualification be required to certify that such candidate has tested negative for illegal
drugs."87 The statute included a long list of offices requiring such certification, from
district attorneys to "Justices of the Supreme Court."88  The legislation's
requirements provided some flexibility and sensitivity. Candidates were allowed to
choose between providing a specimen to a state-approved laboratory or to their
personal physician.89 Further, a candidate could preserve the privacy of a positive
'9 Id. at 653-54.
80 Id. at 661-65. For a more detailed analysis ofthe Vernonia balancing test, see George
M. Dery 111, The Coarsening of Our National Manners: The Supreme Court's Failure to
Protect Privacy Interests of Schoolchildren - Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 29
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 693, 704-09 (1995).
81 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65.
82 Id. at 665.
83 Id. at 661; see also id at 664-65.
84 Id. at 657; see also id. at 664-65.
85 Id. at 663-64.
86 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
87 Id. at 309.
88 The "designated state offices" were:
"Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, State
School Superintendent, Commissioner of Insurance, Commissioner of
Agriculture, Commissioner of Labor, Justices of the Supreme Court, Judges of
the Court of Appeals, judges of the superior courts, district attorneys, members
of the General Assembly, and members of the Public Service Commission."
Id. at 309-10 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-140(a)(4) (1993)).
89 Id. at 310.
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test, because the "results of the test [were] given first to the candidate who controls
further dissemination of the report."" Some Libertarian nominees for state office,
among them Walker L. Chandler, filed suit to enjoin enforcement of the statute,
claiming in part that it violated the Fourth Amendment.9'
This time, the argument against the government's program found a receptive
audience. Although Justice Ginsburg, who authored Chandler, still applied the
balance-of-interests analysis, she reached a result that contrasted dramatically with
prior special needs precedent. When viewing the government's side of the balance,
the Chandler Court noted with dismay that "[n]othing in the record hints that the
hazards [the State] broadly describe[s] are real and not simply hypothetical for
Georgia's polity."92 For instance, Georgia's test, because of its scheduling rules,
could easily be cheated by temporary abstention and therefore failed to offer a
"credible means to deter illicit drug users from seeking election to state office."93
Moreover, there seemed to be no need for the test in the first place, since candidates
"are subject to relentless scrutiny - by their peers, the public, and the press." '94
Justice Ginsburg's rejection of the government's characterization of its own
concerns was therefore total. She declared: "Notably lacking in [the government's]
presentation is any indication of a concrete danger demanding departure from the
Fourth Amendment's main rule."95 Any government need here was "symbolic, not
'special,"' and thus failed to survive the Court's balancing analysis.96
The most recent case offering a discussion of special needs before Earls was
Ferguson v. City of Charleston.9 7 In Ferguson, employees at a public hospital in
Charleston perceived "an apparent increase in the use of cocaine by patients who
were receiving prenatal treatment." 98 Ultimately, the hospital responded to this
health danger by participating in a task force that planned to "prosecute women who
tested positive for cocaine while pregnant."99 The task force formed a policy under
which the hospital would test any patient "through a urine drug screen" if the patient
met one or more of nine criteria."° In some circumstances, patients testing positive
90 Id. at 318.91 Id. at 3 10.
92 Id. at 319.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 32 1.
91 Id. at 318-19.
96 Id. at 322.
97 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
98 Id. at 70.
99 Id. at 72.
'oo Those criteria were:
I. No prenatal care.
2. Late prenatal care after 24 weeks gestation.
3. Incomplete prenatal care.
4. Abruptio placentae.
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could enroll in a substance abuse treatment program.' 0' However, the hospital's
policy also:
prescribed in detail the precise offenses with which a woman could be
charged, depending on the stage of her pregnancy. If the pregnancy was
27 weeks or less, the patient was to be charged with simple possession.
If it was 28 weeks or more, she was to be charged with possession and
distribution to a person under the age of 18 - in this case, the fetus. If
she delivered "while testing positive for illegal drugs," she was also to
be charged with unlawful neglect of a child. 2
Ten women who were arrested after testing positive for cocaine filed suit,
arguing that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated.'0 3 In their defense,
hospital, law enforcement, and city officials urged that the test and arrest policy was
"justified by special non-law enforcement purposes."'" In an opinion written by
Justice Stevens, the Court refused to categorize the case as one of special needs.
The Ferguson Court concluded that this case differed from previous cases "in which
[the Court] considered whether comparable drug tests 'fit within the closely guarded
category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches.'" 05 Justice Stevens
found the "critical difference" between this and previous drug testing cases which
the Court upheld "lies in the nature of the 'special need' asserted" to justify the
searches."° The earlier cases had special needs "divorced from the State's general
interest in law enforcement."' 7  In Ferguson, however, "the central and
indispensable feature of the policy from its inception was the use of law
enforcement to coerce the patients into substance abuse treatment."'08 Simply, there
can be no special needs balancing in the absence of a special need recognized by the
Court.
5. Intrauterine fetal death.
6. Preterm labor "of no obvious cause."
7. IUGR [intrauterine growth retardation] "of no obvious cause."
8. Previously known drug or alcohol abuse.
9. Unexplained congenital anomalies.
Id. at 72 n.4 (citation omitted).
'o' Id. at 72.
102 Id. at 72-73 (citation omitted).
'o' Id. at 73.
104 Id.
o' Id. at 77 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997)).
106 Id. at 79.
107 Id.
'o' Id. at 80.
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Ill. BOARD OFEDUCATION V. EARLS
A. Factual Background
On September 14, 1998, the Tecumseh Public School District in Oklahoma
adopted a drug testing policy requiring "all students who participate in
extracurricular activities to submit to suspicionless drug testing."' 9 In establishing
this program, school officials were not responding to the kind of "state of rebellion"
that precipitated a crisis in James Acton's school in Vernonia."° Instead of such an
immediate threat, the school district was dealing with "some evidence of student
drug abuse dating back to the 1970's..'' . Further, officials in Tecumseh used the
phrase "drug abuse" in a broad sense to include alcoholic beverages and tobacco.
Ms. Meoli, who spoke on behalf of the Board of Education at the Court's oral
argument, noted that the "district has always admitted that alcohol really is the
number one problem in the school district.""' 2 School officials "were saying at the
same time that they didn't have a problem with - with what we usually refer to as
drugs. ' ' 13
Tecumseh's officials were able to piece together instances of drug use, even if
many were based "upon hearsay, or [were] virtually anecdotal.""' 4  Carolyn
Daugherty, the "vocal music teacher and choir director," testified that although "she
had never caught a choir member using illegal drugs," she has had "students tell her
they thought some other student was using drugs.""'  Ms. Daugherty herself
suspected some students of substance abuse because "'appearance wise their eyes
looked dilated [and] they looked spaced out.""' 6 In her twenty-nine years of
teaching, Ms. Daugherty had "referred one student to the office for suspected drug
use," and "a choir member was caught six or seven years previously bringing
alcohol concealed in a cough syrup bottle on a trip."' " Despite these instances, Ms.
Daugherty believed "most of her choir students do not use drugs.""s
Scrounging up evidence of drug use among students actually participating in
extracurricular activities was a challenge. Shiela Evans, a teacher, testified that "she
did not think that any of her students" who competed in the Future Homemakers of
' Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1282 (W.D. Okla. 2000).
"o Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995).
... Earls, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1285.
112 Oral Argument at *5, Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (No. 01-332), 2002
WL 485032.
113 Id.
"14 Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1274 (10th Cir. 2001).
, Id. at 1273.
1 Id. (alteration in original).
117 Id.
118 Id.
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America (FHA) used drugs."9 Another teacher, Danny Sterling, offered little more
evidence. Over the past five years, he had spoken to the principal about one student
he suspected of drug use and one time even "'smelt the aroma of pot."" 20 Further,
Mr. Sterling estimated seeing "ten students per year" whom he believed were on
drugs.12' However, none of these users competed in the Future Farmers of America
(FFA) program."' In fact, he testified that "students in FFA were less likely to use
drugs than students who were not so involved.' 23
The testimony providing the most direct link between drugs and extracurricular
activities came from Dean Rogers, who spoke of "[flourteen instances of drug
usage." 24 A careful examination of the actual specifics of these instances belies
what the Court of Appeals called "distortions of the record," for they fail to be as
damning as Roger's statement would imply. 2 Many "instances" were nothing more
than reports from her children or grandchildren that "unidentified" persons were
seen with or spoke of "marijuana," "drug paraphernalia," or "smokes."' 26 Dean
Rogers, however, also spoke of an "unidentified boy" offering her daughter "some
pills," and mentioned an incident "in 1972 or 1973" in which a person "sold
drugs."'1
27
Some of the drug hazards grew with the telling. Evidence heard by the District
Court prompted it to find the following evidence of drug usage: "Injuries which
have occurred to students and members of the public by District students engaged
in Competitive Activities under the influence of drugs."''12  Closer inspection
revealed that these "injuries" to "students" and "members of the public" were in fact
a single incident in which "a steer got loose from a student under the influence of
some substance, injuring himself and one other person.' 129 Nonetheless, regardless
of the actual number involved, this incident provides a link, however rare, between
drug use and extracurricular activities.
School records also provide paltry proof of drugs endangering students during
extracurricular activities. Of twenty disciplinary referrals at the high school,
"occurring over an unspecified period of time," thirteen involved a drug dog
"showing an interest in the student, or his or her vehicle or locker."'30 Although one
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1274.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 1273.
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of these alerts involved marijuana possession, the "remainder involved possession
of or suspected consumption of alcohol."'' None of these disciplinary referrals
provides evidence linking the involved students to extracurricular activities.'32
At times, Tecumseh school officials themselves seemed less than certain of the
existence of a drug problem. In its 1995-1996 application for funds under the Safe
and Drug-Free Schools and Communities program, the district's "analysis of current
use" stated: "[T]he use of the surveys have provided us with information
concerning alcohol as our number one problem. Our students express that the main
use is alcohol on the weekends. We have not found other types of illegal or
controlled substances to be a major problem although they do exist."' 33 Officials
again failed to sound any alarm the next year, reporting that:
The use of tobacco and alcohol continue to be our number one problems.
Our students utilize that alcohol primarily on the weekends and use
tobacco, especially smokeless tobacco, on a more regular basis. Other
types of drugs including, controlled dangerous substances, are present
but have not identified themselves as major problems at this time.'34
During 1998-1999, the very year that the school was requiring students in
extracurricular activities to provide urine samples, the school's Safe and Drug-Free
Schools and Communities report contained a statement "virtually identical" to the
prior statements. 135
Rather than referring to its own reports, the Tecumseh School District responded
to various accounts of drug use by mandating urinalysis of students wishing to
participate in "any extracurricular activity.' 136 The Student Activities Drug Testing
Policy covered "FFA [Future Farmers of America], FHA [Future Homemakers of
America], Academic Team, Band, Vocal, Pom Pon, Cheerleader and Athletics."' 37
For "many years," Tecumseh High School offered such activities as FFA, FHA,
choir, marching band, and color guard to "all students who wished to participate." '' 38
Team sports and some other activities were offered on a "competitive basis.' 139
131 Id.
132 Id. at 1274.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1282 (W.D. Okla. 2000) (emphasis
added).
117 Id. As to the reference to "Por Pon," the Court of Appeals noted: "The drug testing
policy itself and the district court's opinion both describe this activity as Pom Pon. We
accordingly refer to it that way in this opinion." Earls, 242 F.3d at 1267 n.2.
' Earls, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1282.
139 Id.
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Consequently, the "vast majority of students" participated in "one or more school-
sponsored activities."'4 ° Yet, to avoid being barred from participation under the new
policy, students were required to submit to three different testing regimes: I) testing
"before participating" in the activity; 2) testing "randomly during the year while
participating" in the activity; and 3) testing "at any time while participating in
competitive activities upon reasonable suspicion."'' The urinalysis tested for
"amphetamines, cannabinoid metabolites (marijuana), cocaine, opiates, barbiturates,
and benzodiazepines."' 42 The screen did not detect alcohol or nicotine.'43 Unless
waived by an informally created policy,"' each student was charged a yearly fee of
four dollars to cover the costs of testing.' 45
For testing, students were called out of class "in groups of two or three,"
directed to the bathroom, and monitored by faculty who waited "outside the closed
restroom stall for the student to produce the sample.'46 The monitor then poured
"the contents of the vial into two bottles," and together student and teacher sealed
the bottles.'47 The bottles, along with a form signed by the student, were then placed
into a mailing pouch "in the presence of the student."'4 Also enclosed by the
student, if pertinent, would be a form listing any legally prescribed medications.
49
The test results, placed in "files separate from the students' other educational files,"
would be "disclosed only to those school personnel who have a need to know" and
would not be turned over to law enforcement authorities. 5 °
The mandatory urinalysis created discomfort for both students and faculty. Ms.
Daugherty testified that "ten percent of her students have complained about the drug
testing procedure."'' Four students dropped Ms. Daugherty's choir class since the
implementation of the drug testing policy, one explaining her dropping the class was
"because of the drug testing policy."' 52 Another teacher, Grant Gower, "testified
that some students gave sideways looks to each other, and giggled and snickered
during the testing procedure."' 53 Even a teacher commented that "she felt she was
engaging in potty training."' 54
140 Id.
141 Id. at 1282-83.
142 Id. at 1283.
141 Earls, 242 F.3d at 1267.
'44 Earls, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1283 n.4.
145 Id. at 1283.
146 Earls, 242 F.3d at 1267.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 1268.
150 Id.
5 ' Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1291 n.38 (W.D. Okla. 2000).
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
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These trips to the restroom resulted in 243 students being tested in the
1998-1999 school year and some 241 students submitting to urinalysis in the
1999-2000 school year. 5 ' Of these 484 students, four students (three from high
school and one from junior high school) tested positive.'56 All three high school
students played in school athletic programs and thus presumably would have been
discovered in a more traditional Vernonia-type test of students in sports. 157
B. Litigation in the Lower Courts
Lindsay Earls, a member of the "show choir, the marching band and the
academic team,"'58 filed suit in federal court challenging the portion of the testing
policy that mandated "drug testing of students participating in non-athletic
activities."'59  Judge David Russell of the District Court acknowledged that
"[a]dmittedly the evidence in this case does not show an epidemic of illegal drug
abuse in the Tecumseh School District."'" Yet, the District Court decided that,
"[w]hile the evidence in this case does not show a drug problem of epidemic
proportions, or a student body in a state of rebellion, it certainly shows legitimate
cause for concern."' 61 Judge Russell reasoned that, regardless of particulars at
Tecumseh High School, "[t]his Court is well aware of the prevalence of illegal drugs
in our society, including our schools.' '162 He thus concluded that a special need for
random drug testing existed. 63
In performing special needs balancing, Judge Russell regarded schoolchildren's
privacy concerns as diminished because "simply being a student in a public school
is 'central' to a lowered expectation of privacy."'" As for the character of the State
intrusion, the District Court figured that it was "the same basic procedure described
's Earls, 242 F.3d at 1273.
156 Id.
157 Id.
1 Id. at 1268.
's Earls, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1283. An additional plaintiff, Daniel James, also sued,
seeking to participate "in the academic team in the 1999/2000 school year." Id. at 1282. A
dispute arose over James's standing, due to potential ineligibility to pursue extracurricular
activities because of failing grades and a suspension. Id. at 1282 n. I. The district court
declared: "The Court finds it unnecessary to resolve this dispute under the circumstances.
Because there is no suggestion of lack of standing on the part of Plaintiff Lindsay Earls, the
Court must reach the merits of the Plaintiffs' constitutional attack on the District's drug
testing policy in any event." Id.
'60 Id. at 1285.
161 Id. at 1287.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 1288.
'64 Id. at 1289.
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in Vernonia" and thus had "negligible" impact on privacy. 6 Turning to the
effectiveness of the drug testing policy, Judge Russell simply made a bald
assumption that: "It can scarcely be disputed that the drug problem among the
student body is effectively addressed by making sure that the large number of
students participating in competitive, extracurricular activities do not use drugs. '
The interests therefore weighed in the government's favor of performing
suspicionless drug testing.'67
The Court of Appeals likewise decided the case in terms of special needs
balancing.'68 Judge Anderson, writing for the majority, first considered the nature
of the student's privacy interest being affected by the drug tests.'69 Here, Judge
Anderson urged: "We do not believe that voluntary participation in an activity,
without more, should reduce a student's expectation of privacy in his or her body.
Members of our society voluntarily engage in a variety of activities every day, and
do not thereby suffer a reduction in their constitutional rights."'7  However,
voluntary participation in this case did temper privacy expectations. The Court of
Appeals concluded:
[S]tudents participating in non-athletic extracurricular activities.., do,
like athletes, agree to follow the directives and adhere to the rules set out
by the coach or other director of the activity. This inevitably requires
that their personal freedom to conduct themselves is, in some small way,
constrained at least some of the time. We therefore conclude that, like
athletes, participants in other extracurricular activities have a somewhat
lesser privacy expectation than other students. 7 '
Although indeed thoughtful, the "somewhat lesser privacy expectation" standard
lacked clarity and therefore added little to the rest of the balancing process.
When it turned to weighing the "'character of the intrusion that is complained
of," ' 172 the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that Tecumseh's
urinalysis scheme was "virtually identical to the testing process in Vernonia," and
therefore, the resulting privacy intrusion was "not significant."' 173 Judge Anderson,
165 Id. at 1291.
166 Id. at 1295.
167 Id. at 1296.
168 The Court of Appeals stated: "[W]e take Vernonia, the only Supreme Court case
involving suspicionless drug testing of a group of students at a public school, as the primary
guide for our analysis of this case." Earls, 242 F.3d at 1270.
169 Id. at 1276.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. (quoting Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,658 (1995)).
171 Earls, 242 F.3d at 1276 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 660).
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however, found the drug use "among students subject to the testing" to be
"negligible."" 4 Indeed, the drug situation at the Tecumseh schools was "vastly
different from the epidemic of drug use and discipline problems among the very
group subject to testing in Vernonia."'"7 Therefore the "nature and immediacy of
governmental concern" factor tipped "the balancing analysis decidedly in favor of
the plaintiffs."' 76 The Court of Appeals concluded that "the policy violates the
Fourth Amendment."' 77
C. The Court's Opinion
After the two lower courts weighed the competing concerns, the Supreme Court
in Earls chose to balance the interests yet a third time. At the outset, Justice
Thomas, the author of the Court's opinion, found it significant "that 'special needs'
inhere in the public school context."''7 The first interest to be measured was that of
the privacy of students "allegedly compromised by the drug testing.' ' 79 Here, the
Court emphasized: "A student's privacy interest is limited in a public school
environment where the State is responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and
safety. Schoolchildren are routinely required to submit to physical examinations
and vaccinations against disease."' 0 Furthermore, "students who participate in
competitive extracurricular activities voluntarily subject themselves to many of the
same intrusions" experienced by Vernonia's athletes.' 8 ' The majority thus
concluded that the students' submission to urinalysis implicated "a limited
expectation of privacy."8
The "character of the intrusion" went next onto Earls's special needs scales. 83
The Court handled this variable in short order, finding the drug testing procedure to
be "virtually identical" to the program it approved in Vernonia 84 Earls therefore
deemed the urinalysis of the students participating in extracurricular activities to be
similarly "negligible."''85
When Justice Thomas considered the third factor in the balance, the "nature and
immediacy of the government's concerns and the efficacy of the Policy in meeting
114 Earls, 242 F.3d at 1275.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 1276.
117 Id. at 1267.
178 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002).
19 Id. at 830.
0o Id. at 830-31 (emphasis in original).
1"' Id. at 831.
182 Id. at 832.
183 Id.
184 Id.
18 Id. at 833.
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them," he worried that "the nationwide drug epidemic makes the war against drugs
a pressing concern in every school."'8 6 As to the drug threats faced by students at
Tecumseh High School, the Court declined to "second-guess" the trial court's
finding that "'viewing the evidence as a whole, it cannot be reasonably disputed that
the [School District] was faced with a 'drug problem' when it adopted the
Policy."" 87 The Court declared the school district "entirely reasonable" in enacting
the drug testing policy. 88 Moreover, the policy itself was a "reasonably effective
means" for "preventing, deterring, and detecting drug use." '189 Earls therefore found
the school district's drug testing of students participating in extracurricular activities
to be constitutionally reasonable." 9
IV. THE UNINTENDED LESSONS CREATED BY THE COURT'S LATEST
INTERPRETATION OF SPECIAL NEEDS IN EARLS
In spite of its varied formulations over the decades,' 9 ' the special needs
balancing of interests has boiled down to the weighing of three factors: 1) the nature
of the privacy interest;'92 2) the character of the intrusion imposed by the
government;193 and 3) the nature and immediacy of the government's concerns.1 94
When considering each of these factors in its turn, the Earls Court has taught us, by
example, how to view and treat our nation's schoolchildren. As seen below, the
Court's analysis of each of the three above factors has developed its own curious
lesson.
86 Id. at 834.
187 Id. (quoting Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1287 (W.D. Okla. 2000))
(alteration in original).
18 Earls, 536 U.S. at 836.
"9 Id. at 837.
90 Id. at 838.
' As noted in Part III, the special needs test has varied over time. At its inception in
T.L.O., the test included a requirement of individualized suspicion. See New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-43 (1985). Moreover, Vernonia complicated the balancing test
in a variety of ways. It described the government's role as "guardian and tutor" as being
"[tlhe most significant element." Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665
(1995). Also, Vernonia further divided each factor into sub-factors. For instance, the first
interest of student privacy was broken down into the "context" in which the interest was
asserted and the individual's "legal relationship with the State." Id. at 654. The second
factor of character of intrusion was parsed into a review of the manner of the intrusion and
the information it divulged. Id. at 658. The third government interest factor was divided into
three queries: the nature of the government concern, the immediacy of that concern, and the
efficacy of the government program. Id. at 660.
192 Earls, 536 U.S. at 830.
'9 Id. at 832.
194 Id. at 834.
[Vol. 11: 11551174
AFFECTING ETERNITY
A. Earls Taught that an Educator Can Patronize Students
When the Court considered the privacy interests implicated by Tecumseh's
urinalysis testing, it violated an obvious and fundamental tenet of education that a
teacher must respect his or her students. Notably, in his first sentence on the subject,
Justice Thomas seemed to resent even having to go through the exercise of weighing
the facts on the students' side of the balance, for he characterized the privacy
interests here as "allegedly compromised."' 95  Such an attitude represented a
considerable erosion of the respect shown to students since the time of TL.O., when
Justice White explained that a search of a student's "closed purse or other bag"
should be considered "no less than a similar search carried out on an adult."'196
Furthermore, TL.O. did not hesitate to characterize such an intrusion as
"undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy." '97 The
Court's steady dismantling of deference toward student privacy becomes all the
more apparent when it is noted that TL. 0. expressed these concerns for an intrusion
on a merepurse. By the time the Court wrote its decision in Earls, Justice Thomas
demonstrated less concern for an invasion of a student's own body.
Earls discounted students' privacy interests by focusing on the "context of a
public school environment," as the "backdrop" for its analysis.'98 The Court relied
heavily on what it termed the "'most significant element in this case"' - that in the
"'public school system,"' the government acted as the children's "'guardian and
tutor.""" The student's privacy interest was thus "limited in a public school
environment where the State is responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and
safety. 200
The "guardian and tutor" rationale, however, does not provide the soundest of
foundations. Its main proponent was Justice Scalia, who authored the Court's
opinion in Vernonia.2 ° In that decision, Justice Scalia intoned:
Traditionally at common law, and still today, unemancipated minors lack
some of the most fundamental rights of self-determination - including
even the right of liberty in its narrow sense, i.e., the right to come and go
at will. They are subject, even as to their physical freedom, to the control
of their parents or guardians. 20
2
'I ld. at 830.
'96 T.L.0., 469 U.S. at 337-38.
197 Id. at 338.
'98 Earls, 536 U.S. at 830.
'99 Id. (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995)).
200 Id..
20 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-55.
0'2 Id. at 654.
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Justice Scalia then extended this restriction over children's liberty to include the
schoolyard. He flatly asserted: "When parents place minor children in private
schools for their education, the teachers and administrators of those schools stand
in loco parentis over the children entrusted to them. In fact, the tutor or
schoolmaster is the very prototype of that status.""2 3 The Court in TL. 0., however,
had already explicitly rejected the "in locoparentis" rationale, noting that "the Court
has recognized that 'the concept of parental delegation' as a source of school
authority is not entirely 'consonant with compulsory education laws."'
Furthermore, Earls's and Vernonia's placement of students in the "context" of
the "guardian and tutor" relationship with the State exposed another mode of
reasoning even more offensive to student dignity. In Vernonia, Justice Scalia
openly likened students to convicted criminals. He opined:
[T]he legitimacy of certain privacy expectations vis-A-vis the State may
depend upon the individual's legal relationship with the State. For
example, in Griffin, we held that, although a "probationer's home, like
anyone else's, is protected by the Fourth Amendment," the supervisory
relationship between probationer and State justifies "a degree of
impingement upon [a probationer's] privacy that would not be
constitutional if applied to the public at large." Central, in our view to
the present case, is the fact that the subjects of the Policy are (1) children,
who (2) have been committed to the temporary custody of the State as
schoolmaster. °5
Interestingly, one decade earlier in TL.O., the same Court had considered the
rights of criminals so as to contrast them with those of students. In T.L.O, Justice
White, although recognizing the "difficulty of maintaining discipline in the public
schools today," still emphasized that "the situation is not so dire that students in the
schools may claim no legitimate expectation of privacy."2"4 In this vein, he declared
that "it goes almost without saying that '[the] prisoner and the schoolchild stand in
wholly different circumstances, separated by the harsh facts of criminal conviction
and incarceration."'2 7 The TL. 0. Court, therefore, was "not yet ready to hold that
the schools and the prisons need be equated for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment." ' When Earls took on Justice Scalia's "guardian and tutor" logic,
203 Id. at 654-55.
204 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651, 662 (1977)).
205 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873, 875
(1987)) (citations omitted) (second alteration in original).
206 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338.
207 Id. (quoting Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 669) (alteration in original).
208 Id at 338-39.
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it also inherited Vernonia's underlying distrust of students, eroding the Court's
respect for schoolchildren.
B. Earls Signaled that a Teacher Need Not Know the Subject of the Lesson
It should go without saying that every teacher must be a master of his or her
subject. As they ask questions and seek guidance, students naturally rely on the
teacher's expertise in the material at hand. Despite the patent importance of this
point, the Earls Court apparently did not heed it and thus failed to adequately
prepare for its own lesson. In examining "the character of the intrusion imposed"
by the drug policy,2 9 Justice Thomas vainly attempted to hide the Court's apparent
gaps of knowledge regarding special needs by offering the briefest analysis possible.
Earls simply stated that Tecumseh's urinalysis of students was "virtually identical
to that reviewed in Vernonia" which had been labeled a "negligible" intrusion.2"'
Further, since the Tecumseh policy allowed male students to provide a sample
"behind a closed stall," Earls considered it "even less problematic." 2t ' Justice
Thomas also noted that, rather than being turned over to law enforcement, test
results were given only to those who had a "need to know."2"2 The Court thus
concluded that, "[g]iven the minimally intrusive nature of the sample collection and
the limited uses to which the test results are put .... invasion of students' privacy
is not significant." '2 t3 Earls thus dispatched special needs' "character of intrusion"
factor quickly and simply.
This surface treatment of privacy intrusion exposed Earls's willful ignorance
both of the relevant circumstances of the Vernonia case and of the world of the
schoolchild. As to the situation faced by the students in Vernonia, Justice Scalia
specifically had recognized that "[I]egitimate privacy expectations [were] even less
with regard to student athletes."2 " He then pursued this point with a detailed
description of the atmosphere of athletics: "School sports are not for the bashful.
They require 'suiting up' before each practice or event, and showering and changing
afterwards. Public school locker rooms, the usual sites for these activities, are not
notable for the privacy they afford."2 5 Vernonia then reviewed the actual physical
facilities used by the school's athletes, noting: "No individual dressing rooms are
provided; shower heads are lined up along a wall, unseparated by any sort of
partition or curtain; not even all the toilet stalls have doors."2"6 Thus, when students
209 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 832 (2002).
210 Id. at 832-33.
211 Id. at 833.
212 Id. at 833.
213 Id. at 834.
214 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995).
215 Id.
216 Id.
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in Vernonia, Oregon, went "out for the team," they "voluntarily subjected
themselves" to an entire series of very particular privacy intrusions.
21 7
Such was simply not the case in Tecumseh, Oklahoma. Ironically, perhaps the
most vivid evidence of the differences between athletics and other extracurricular
programs was offered by the Earls Court in its vain attempt to liken the two. Justice
Thomas asserted that "students who participate in competitive extracurricular
activities voluntarily subject themselves to many of the same intrusions on their
privacy as do athletes." ' The facts that Justice Thomas relied upon to support his
equation, however, were sparse indeed. Instead of all participants "suiting up"
before every event, the best Earls could offer was that "[s]ome of these clubs and
activities require occasional off-campus travel and communal undress." '219 Justice
Thomas also emphasized that all of the activities "have their own rules and
requirements" and employ a "faculty sponsor" who "monitors the students for
compliance with the various rules dictated by the clubs and activities.""22 Such basic
limits are a far cry from the omnipresent locker room atmosphere detailed by the
Vernonia Court. Earls simply lacks any mention of locker rooms, showers, or toilet
stalls.
Moreover, Earls's measurement of privacy intrusion revealed the Court's
curious amnesia about childhood. There is a reason why athletes in school are not
intimidated by the "'element of communal undress"'2 '" present in a locker room; by
and large, those who participate in physical activities possess a level of comfort with
their bodies. Indeed, athletes usually come to rely upon their physical abilities to
gain acceptance, recognition, and even admiration. In contrast, students who aim
to succeed in the academic team, the band, or choir, are relying on abilities that may
be far removed from a person's strength or physique. Such activities may be all the
more important, for they enable those students who are not as comfortable with their
growing bodies to become an active part of the school community. Thus the Earls
Court, by lumping together all extracurricular activities into the same group as
sports, failed to appreciate the individual differences among students. Justice
Thomas took one standard, previously limited to the fittest of students, and applied
it to all children regardless of their sense of self. Earls's reasoning in this regard
217 Id.
28 Earls, 536 U.S. at 831.
219 Id. at 832 (emphasis added). The reasoning here contrasts awkwardly with the Court's
consideration of the intrusion on student privacy interests occasioned when a teacher left
prescription information out for others to see. Id. It is curious that the Court considered as
relevant a factor that only "occasional[ly]" occurred when it was weighing information in
favor of the government interests, and yet dismissed, as an isolated example, a privacy
intrusion when considering the individual's side of the balance. Id.
220 Id.
221 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657 (quoting Schaill ex rel. Kross v. Tippecanoe County Sch.
Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1318 (1988)).
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was particularly insensitive, in light of the evidence presented by the participants
themselves. Some ten percent of the students openly complained to Ms. Daugherty
about the drug testing, whereas others simply dropped out of choir altogether.
22
Those who chose to endure the urinalysis demonstrated their discomfort with
giggles and snickers. 23 Even the teachers were bothered, joking about engaging in
"potty training. '224 Thus, in lecturing on the level of intrusion, Earls showed an
ignorance of the very people its rule was most affecting.
A more careful review of precedent would have cautioned the Court against any
shallow analysis of the character of intrusion. In Chandler, Justice Ginsburg
deemed an even less intrusive drug-testing program than that in Earls to be
unreasonable. 2 5 Georgia's urinalysis of candidates for office was "relatively
noninvasive," '226 since subjects were given a choice to produce a sample at a state-
approved lab or at the office of a private physician.227 Moreover, the candidate was
the first to receive the results of the urinalysis and therefore controlled "further
dissemination of the report. '22 ' Despite these precautions, the Court still held
Georgia's testing regime to be unconstitutional. 29 This was due in part to Justice
Ginsburg's insistence on remembering the bigger picture. Chandler's rejection of
drug testing included not only a review of its impact on the individual, but also its
purpose - an issue considered in the next section.
C. Earls Indicated that an Educator Need Not Be Consistent
Perhaps the people most sensitive to the school's role as "'guardian and
tutor',' 23" are the students themselves, for they are the very subjects of government
monitoring and discipline. Arguably, those who must follow the rules tend to be
quite alert to any inconsistency practiced by the rule-makers. The best teachers,
therefore, lead by consistent conduct and strive to instruct by constancy of example.
Unfortunately, the fundamental need of consistency in education was yet another
principle missed by the Earls Court. Students, ever aware of hypocrisy and double
standards, might heed the wrong lessons from Earls's message.
The Court's inconsistency was most stark in its assessment of the "nature and
immediacy of the government's concerns and the efficacy of the Policy in meeting
222 Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1291 n.38 (10th Cir. 2001).
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997).
226 Id.
27 Id. at310.
228 Id. at 318.
229 Id. at 309.
230 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830 (2002) (quoting Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995)).
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them."23' In weighing the government's interests, Justice Thomas declared: "This
Court has already articulated in detail the importance of the governmental concern
in preventing drug use by schoolchildren." '232 He further proclaimed that "the
nationwide drug epidemic makes the war against drugs a pressing concern in every
school." '233 Earls, however, did not show the same generous view when considering
the students' plight. The Court did not stop to ponder whether the mass use of
urinalysis would cause an entire generation of schoolchildren to become callous or
cynical about a bodily function "traditionally shielded by great privacy." '234 Indeed,
Earls even failed to respect the Court's own prior discussion of urinalysis, where it
noted:
There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the
passing of urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk
about it at all. It is a function traditionally performed without public
observation; indeed, its performance in public is generally prohibited by
law as well as social custom.235
In contrast, Earls subjected the student's side of the equation to a different
standard, in which the intrusion was weighed one bathroom stall at a time.236 When
the schoolchildren worried about the improper safeguarding of sensitive
information, Justice Thomas dismissed the concern as an isolated incident, writing:
"This one example of alleged carelessness hardly increases the character of the
intrusion." '237 Thus, when the government was heard, the stakes were on a national
scale, whereas when the students were considered, the interests were on an
individual scale.
Earls's inconsistency in its treatment of the administration and the individual
became even more glaring when it turned to the particular "evidence of drug use at
Tecumseh schools." '238 Justice Thomas wrung his hands that teachers "had seen
students who appeared to be under the influence of drugs" and "had heard students
speaking openly about using drugs." '239 It did not seem to bother the Court that
much of this information, as the Court of Appeals noted, was based on "hearsay"
and was "virtually anecdotal."24 Many of the reports were of various people who
231 Id. at 834.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 832 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,626 (1989)).
235 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.
236 Earls, 536 U.S. at 833.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 834.
239 Id. at 834-35.
240 Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1274 (10th Cir. 2001).
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were not even identified by their fellow students.24" ' Further, to make any case,
school officials were forced to scrape up examples of drug use dating back decades
to the 1970s. 242 To make matters worse, Justice Thomas himself became part of the
rumor mill by offering that "people in the community were calling the board to
discuss the 'drug situation.' 243 Moreover, Earls relied on evidence of a "drug dog
[who] found marijuana cigarettes near the school parking lot.",2" In its Chicken
Little state of mind, the Court failed to note the full import of this evidence; despite
the fact that the school pursued its drug investigation so diligently that it employed
a special canine to detect drugs, no drugs were found on campus.
The Earls Court's hypersensitivity to the government's interests caused it to
accept the District Court's finding that "'it cannot be reasonably disputed that the
[School District] was faced with a 'drug problem' when it adopted the Policy.""'24
Again, such a statement demonstrates an uneven treatment of the facts, for the
testimony clearly offered the Court evidence of such "reasonable" disputes. Ms.
Daugherty, a veteran teacher of twenty-nine years, expressed the belief that "most
of her choir students do not use drugs. ' 246 Another teacher, Ms. Evans, "did not
think that any of her students .. .used drugs."247 School District officials
themselves, when discussing drugs outside of the guarded context of litigation,
expressed a lack of concern for a major drug problem. 24 ' Although recognizing
problems with tobacco and alcohol, officials repeatedly reported to the Federal
Government that their schools did not have a "major problem" with drugs. 249 Here,
the Earls Court had such trouble with consistency that it could not recognize its
absence in the arguments of the School District.
Earls's solicitous attitude toward the government's concerns bordered on farce
when it considered the dangers imposed by the mix of drugs and extracurricular
activities. The School District strained to stir up visions of danger in such
innocuous activities as music, homemaking, and farming. 5 The effort lacked such
credibility that it moved Justice Ginsburg to quip about "nightmarish images of out-
of-control flatware, livestock run amok, and colliding tubas disturbing the peace and
quiet of Tecumseh. 25'
241 Id.
242 Id. at 1282.
243 Earls, 536 U.S. at 835.
244 Id. (emphasis added).
241 Id. (quoting Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1287 (W.D. Okla. 2000))
(alteration in original).
246 Earls, 242 F.3d at 1273.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 1274.
249 Id.
250 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 851-52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
2' Id. at 852 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
2003] 1181
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
The Court's varying perceptions of risk become all the more evident when
Tecumseh's rumors of drugs affecting extracurricular activities are contrasted with
actual problems confronted in prior cases. In Vernonia, teachers, rather than relying
on hearsay accounts, actually witnessed several alcohol and drug-related accidents
occur during sporting events and practices.252 Students were so bold as to form
"drug culture" groups such as the "Big Elks" and the "Drug Cartel." '253 Further, they
were seen openly using drugs "across the street from the high school."2"4 Drug use
in Vernonia correlated with "an almost three-fold increase in classroom disruptions
and disciplinary reports." '255 Teachers witnessed "various omissions of safety
procedures and misexecutions by football players." '256 The danger was not
hypothetical contact between horns and drums, but a "severe sternum injury."257
The school's officials were at their "wits end," because "a large segment of the
student body . . . was in a state of rebellion. Disciplinary actions had reached
'epidemic proportions." 25" The cumulative effect of this evidence of actual harm
leaves Tecumseh's worries about potential harms pale by comparison.
Likewise, the Tecumseh student brandishing a spatula or trumpet posed nowhere
near the danger at issue in the Court's early suspicionless drug-testing cases -
Skinner and Von Raab. Unlike Earls, Skinner dealt with the prospect of truly
catastrophic events: train wrecks.2"9 In Skinner, Justice Kennedy noted that railroad
employees "discharge duties fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a
momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences."2" A "major
calamity" on the railroads, such as a crash or spill of toxic chemicals, could cause
devastation to an entire community.26' It is not surprising, therefore, that Justice
Kennedy compared train employees to "persons who have routine access to
dangerous nuclear power facilities." '262
In Von Raab, the threats were equally chilling. Justice Kennedy explained:
"[T]he Government [has] a compelling interest in ensuring that many of [the
Customs Service) employees do not use drugs even off duty, for such use creates
risks of bribery and blackmail against which the Government is entitled to guard. 263
The Court further noted the "safety and national security hazards that would attend
252 Acton v. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Or. 1992).
253 Id. at 1356.
254 Id. at 1356-57.
255 Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 649 (1995).
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Id. (quoting Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1357).
259 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 607 (1989).
260 Id. at 628.
261 Id. at 629.
262 Id. at 628.
263 Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989).
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the promotion of drug users to positions that require the carrying of firearms or the
interdiction of controlled substances., 264
When juxtaposed with gun-toting drug users entrusted with fighting the drug
war and railroad employees whose lapses could wipe out entire neighborhoods,
dangers from students involved in such extracurricular activities as choir,
cheerleading, and pom pon are placed in their proper perspective. The tales from
children or grandchildren of people seen with or talking about "marijuana" or
"smokes ' 265 pose a risk of harm more on par with those considered in Chandler,
where Justice Ginsburg noted: "Our precedents establish that the proffered special
need for drug testing must be substantial - important enough to override the
individual's acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth
Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion." 2" In applying this
standard to Georgia's assertions of need, the Court found any evidence of "concrete
danger" to be "[n]otably lacking." '267 The Chandler Court found that "[n]othing in
the record hints that the hazards [state officials] broadly describe are real and not
simply hypothetical for Georgia's polity. '268 Much the same could have been said
of the Tecumseh School District's evidence, which was based essentially on hearsay
accusations directed at unidentified persons. 269 Arguably, Earls could at least make
the dubious assertion that it met Chandler's challenge of establishing "any
indication of a concrete danger,"27 for the described episodes point indirectly to
possible drug use or possession on campus. Yet, such supposition hardly meets
Chandler's standard of an interest so "substantial" that it could "suppress the Fourth
Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion. 27'
The genuine reason underlying Earls's urinalysis of students seems the same as
Chandler's urinalysis of candidates: symbolism. 2 What else could explain a policy
that addresses a problem regarding tobacco and alcohol 273 by testing for
"amphetamines, cannabinoid metabolites (marijuana), cocaine, opiates, barbiturates,
and benzodiazepines?" '274 What other reason could exist for drug-testing children
who purposely involve themselves in the anti-drug pursuits of extracurricular
264 Id.
265 Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1274 n.9 (10th Cir. 2001).
26 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997).
267 ld
268 Id. at 319.
269 Earls, 242 F.3d at 1273-74.
270 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 321-22 (discussing the symbolic benefits of Georgia's drug testing policy).
273 Oral Argument at *5, Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (No. 01-332), 2002
WL 485032.
274 Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1283 (W.D. Okla. 2000).
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activities?27 Why look for something one does not expect to find in a place where
one does not expect to find it? The answer, as the Court in Chandler phrased it, is
that "[t]he need revealed, in short, is symbolic, not 'special,' as that term draws
meaning from our case law." '276 Such a government desire to "set a good example"
is not sufficient to satisfy special needs.277 Yet Earls, blind to the need for
consistency, hung its conclusion on this slim reed.
Earls's shifting standards were further manifested in its assessment of the next
issue involved in the government-interests analysis: the "efficacy of the Policy" in
meeting the school's needs.278 Justice Thomas boldly declared that "testing students
who participate in extracurricular activities is a reasonably effective means of
addressing the School District's legitimate concern in preventing, deterring, and
detecting drug use."279 The only support for this assertion was that the connection
between Tecumseh's testing and drug worries was only a slightly worse "fit" than
that upheld in Vernonia.28 ° Perhaps sensing the weakness of this conclusion, the
Earls Court attempted to hide the defects of its reasoning with the cure-all of the
government-as-guardian.28 ' Justice Thomas saw Vernonia as not mandating that the
school focus on testing "students most likely to use drugs," but rather as a
constitutional consideration of "the context of the public school's custodial
responsibilities.""2 2
The Tecumseh School District needed such a forgiving standard, because a
closer examination of the facts would have revealed even more problems with the
officials' reliance on drug testing. Once again, the Earls Court itself provided the
strongest case against the efficacy of drug testing students. In 1995, the Court
upheld suspicionless drug testing of students in Vernonia.283 Earls noted, however,
that "[tihe drug abuse problem among our Nation's youth has hardly abated since
[then]".2" 4 In fact, Justice Thomas dolefully intoned that "evidence suggests that
[the drug problem] has only grown worse." '285 The Court then provided the
following specific statistics to support its assertion: "[T]he number of 12th graders
using any illicit drug increased from 48.4 percent in 1995 to 53.9 percent in 2001.
275 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 853 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing evidence that "students
who participate in extracurricular activities are significantly less likely to develop substance
abuse problems").
276 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 322.
277 Id.
278 Earls, 536 U.S. at 834.
279 Id. at 837.
280 Id.
281 See id.
282 Id. at 838.
283 Id. at 834.
284 Id.
285 Id.
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The number of 12th graders reporting they had used marijuana jumped from 41.7
percent to 49.0 percent during that same period." '86 Thus, in an irony that
apparently escaped Justice Thomas, the Court gave its hardest facts in proving the
ineffectiveness of urinalysis testing. Such numbers were certainly more convincing
than the Court's vague discussions regarding the "immediacy of the government
concerns" or the "efficacy of the Policy. 287
Tecumseh School District officials compounded the problem by targeting for
testing those students least likely to abuse drugs. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg
made note of scholarly literature which indicated that "[n]ationwide, students who
participate in extracurricular activities are significantly less likely to develop
substance abuse problems than are their less-involved peers. 28 Specifically, "tenth
graders 'who reported spending no time in school-sponsored activities were... 49
percent more likely to have used drugs' than those who spent 1-4 hours per week in
such activities., 289 Further, Justice Ginsburg noted that the prospect of urinalysis
might cause students at risk for drugs to avoid extracurricular activities in order to
evade any monitoring. 290 The School District's policy might have the following
unpleasant, unintended consequences: "Tecumseh's policy thus falls short doubly
if deterrence is its aim: It invades the privacy of students who need deterrence least,
and risks steering students at greatest risk for substance abuse away from
extracurricular involvement that potentially may palliate drug problems. '29'
Compounding Tecumseh's problems was the fact that the school's urinalysis
program tested for such illegal drugs as opiates, amphetamines, and cocaine, even
though it had "always admitted" that alcohol really was its "number one
problem. 292 School officials had repeatedly certified to the federal government that
"tobacco and alcohol" gave them the most trouble, whereas other "controlled
substances," although present, were not "major problems at this time., 293
Finally, Earls not only upheld searches of the wrong people for the wrong
things, it allowed such intrusions to be performed in the most invasive manner
possible: random searches without suspicion.294 Justice Thomas even defended
suspicionless intrusions as a preferred method.295
286 Id. at 834 n.5.
287 Id. at 834.
288 Id. at 853 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
29 Id. (quoting NICHOLAS ZILL ET AL., ADOLESCENT TIME USE, RISKY BEHAVIOR, AND
OUTCOMES: AN ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL DATA 52 (1995)) (omission in original).
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Oral Argument at *5, Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (No. 01-332), 2002
WL 485032.
293 Earls, 242 F.3d at 1274; see supra text accompanying note 249.
294 Earls, 536 U.S. at 837.
295 See id
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[W]e question whether testing based on individualized suspicion in fact
would be less intrusive. Such a regime would place an additional burden
on public school teachers who are already tasked with the difficult job of
maintaining order and discipline. A program of individualized suspicion
might unfairly target members of unpopular groups. The fear of lawsuits
resulting from such targeted searches may chill enforcement of the
program, rendering it ineffective in combating drug use.296
What may be most notable here about Earls's defense of blanket testing is its
identification of the government as the target of its own intrusive program.
Perversely, Justice Thomas worried about the stress that urinalysis would have on
the teachers who handed out the cups rather than the students who were forced to
fill them.297 He fretted that individualized suspicion would harm the government's
cause by spawning lawsuits. 98 The Fourth Amendment by its very terms, however,
guards "the people" from government intrusions rather than concerning itself with
the welfare of those officials actually performing the invasions of privacy.'" Justice
Thomas, in protecting the government's interests, turned the Fourth Amendment on
its head.
Besides misdirecting its concerns, Earls's defense of suspicionless testing also
misconstrued the whole purpose of the Fourth Amendment's individualized
suspicion requirement. Without proper reference to context, Justice Thomas
plucked the following single phrase out of Skinner: "[A] showing of individualized
suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which a search must be presumed
29 Id.
297 id.
298 Id. Strangely, Justice Thomas expressed concern over a potential lawsuit motivated
by the lack of an individualized suspicion standard. Id. If opening the floodgates to
litigation is a valid factor to consider in whether the Court chooses to recognize a right, it
would seem that this argument would cut against Earls's reasoning rather than in its favor.
After all, the Court in Earls was reacting to an actual lawsuit based on suspicionless testing,
whereas litigation from suspicion-based testing is mere speculation. The Court has refused
to consider such speculative arguments in the past. For instance, when the Court considered
whether to allow the impeachment exception to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule
in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), it deemed the possibility that this impeachment
exception would lessen deterrence of illegal police activity to be "speculative," and thus
dismissed any such danger. Id. at 225. The Harris Court preferred to focus on more certain
outcomes, noting: "Assuming that the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on proscribed
police conduct, sufficient deterrence flows when the evidence in question is made
unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief." Id.
299 The Fourth Amendment provides in part: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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unreasonable.,, 3' The Earls Court used this reasoning as a means to justify treating
individualized suspicion as a question of policy rather than constitutional mandate.
Such an approach conflicted sharply with the Court's long line of precedent
prohibiting any search or seizure absent a reason to interfere.
Over three-quarters of a century ago, in the seminal case creating the automobile
exception, Carroll v. United States, the Court clearly established that individualized
suspicion was a constitutional mandate.301 Chief Justice Taft, who authored the
Court's opinion, declared: "The measure of legality of [a warrantless automobile]
seizure is, therefore, that the seizing officer shall have reasonable or probable cause
for believing that the automobile which he stops and seizes has contraband liquor
therein which is being illegally transported. 30 2
The Carroll Court would accept no lesser standard. In fact, Chief Justice Taft
proclaimed: "It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were
authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor and thus subject
all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such
a search. 30 3 Carroll placed the onus not on individuals to go along with everyone
else, but on the government to explain why it should bother someone in the first
place. Specifically, the Court found that "those lawfully within the country, entitled
to use the public highways, have a right to free passage without interruption or
search unless there is known to a competent official authorized to search, probable
cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal
merchandise.,, 3' The importance of these statements becomes all the more apparent
when their context is considered. The Carroll Court refused to allow suspicionless
search and seizure when the intrusion involved only a privacy invasion of an
automobile, rather than the deeper intrusion occasioned by the testing of an
individual's own bodily fluids. Moreover, when the Carroll Court handed down
this case, the nation was in the midst of another high-stakes drug war: prohibition.3 5
Despite the lack of any intrusion on an individual's person, and during a battle with
organized criminal distributors of contraband, the Court still respected the Fourth
Amendment requirement of individualized suspicion.
Over fifty years later, in Delaware v. Prouse,3 °6 the Court again abided by its
300 Earls, 536 U.S. at 837 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,
624 (1989)) (alteration in original).
301 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1924).
302 Id. The Court reached such a rule by construing the "Fourth Amendment... in the
light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in
a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual
citizens." Id. at 149.
303 Id. at 153-54.
304 Id. at 154.
305 See id.
306 440 U.S. 648 (1978).
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individualized suspicion requirement. The majority, in an opinion written by Justice
White, held random stops of motorists to be unreasonable, "even [when] the purpose
of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.""3 7 Upon "balancing"
the intrusion of a particular law enforcement's practice "against its promotion of
legitimate governmental interests," Prouse still adhered to the rule that "the
reasonableness standard usually requires, at a minimum, that the facts upon which
an intrusion is based be capable of measurement against 'an objective standard,'
whether this be probable cause or a less stringent test., 308
When the Court did allow blanket government intrusion, it did so only because
circumstances in the particular case were such that an individualized suspicion
requirement would doom any possibility of the program's success. In Camara v.
Municipal Court of San Francisco,3 9 the Court upheld housing inspections so as to
escape a chicken-egg problem wherein government officials aimed to stop
hazardous housing conditions, which rarely generated articulable grounds for
searching a particular residence until after the inspection.310 United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte provided another example in which a mandate of individualized
suspicion would have prevented the operation of the government program."' In
Martinez-Fuerte, the Court held that a "particularized suspicion" that a car held an
undocumented alien "would be impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be
too heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car that would enable it to be
identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens.",3 2 Finally, in Skinner, the Court
found that any "requirement of particularized suspicion of drug or alcohol use would
seriously impede" the railroad's ability to gather information regarding employee
impairment: "Obtaining evidence that might give rise to the suspicion that a
particular employee is impaired ... is most impracticable in the aftermath of a
serious accident., 313 Suspicionless drug tests offered the only genuine deterrence
of "illegal drug use by railroad employees, workers positioned to 'cause great
human loss before any signs of impairment become noticeable to supervisors."' 3 4
The precedent thus establishes that a constitutional mandate of individualized
suspicion is so important that the Court historically would not excuse its absence
unless it actually endangered the implementation of the government program. 3 "
Quite simply, no such case was made in Earls. Indeed, the Earls Court did not even
307 Id. at 653.
308 Id. at 654.
309 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
310 Id. at 535-36.
31 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
312 Id. at 557.
33 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 631 (1989).
114 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 315 (1997).
"' See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624 (arguing in favor of maintaining individualized suspicion
unless the government interests involved were placed "in jeopardy").
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consider whether this program could be implemented by employing some standard
of individualized suspicion. This is all the more puzzling in light of the facts
presented by the government itself. With all of Tecumseh High School's ever-alert
teachers and administrators, it would seem that drug use could be detected before
two trombones collided or a hog got loose.
V. CONCLUSION
Almost everyone can remember a teacher who, frustrated with the misbehavior
of one pupil, chose to punish the entire class. Perhaps this can be effective - the
naughty child might respond to the peer pressure brought to bear by the group of
punished students. It is, however, a crude form of discipline, for it punishes the
innocent many for the wrongs of the few. It is therefore a poor teaching method.
More importantly, when practiced by the government in the form of suspicionless
searches and seizures, it should be deemed unconstitutional.
In Earls, however, the Court chose to teach a different lesson. Justice Thomas
instructed that when a school fears alcohol and tobacco, it is reasonable for the
institution to test for any illegal drugs.316 Moreover, the Court lectured that when
rumors persist that some students are abusing substances, it does not violate the
Fourth Amendment to compel urinalysis of those students least likely to be involved
in drugs." 7 In short, the lesson learned is that if officials do not know how to detect
and deter the true troublemakers, they can turn the good students into whipping
boys.
This teaching is the very antithesis of the Fourth Amendment, a constitutional
guarantee of the security and privacy of the individual against the invasions of the
State. By abandoning Fourth Amendment fundamentals in its latest extension of the
special needs doctrine, the Court has lost its way We learn that an invasion of an
individual's privacy interest in the very contents of his or her person is "limited,
" 318
even though the mere opening of a purse has constituted a "severe violation" of
privacy expectations." 9 The Earls Court further tutors that the character of the
intrusion - the compelled urinalysis of students - is less than "negligible."32
Finally, we are drilled that government drug-testing programs, which have seen a
documented rise in drug use since their implementation,32' are effective means of
combating a non-problem among the school's most dedicated students. After
presenting such a confused lesson, it is evident that the Court itself should hit the
books.
316 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002).
... Earls, 536 U.S. at 825.
3 Earls, 536 U.S. at 832.
3 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337-38 (1985).
320 Earls, 536 U.S. at 833.
321 See id. at 834 n.5.
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